Technion  Israel Institute of Technology 
The William Davidson Faculty
of Industrial Engineering and Management 

 
 

Rann Smorodinsky received his B.Sc., M.Sc. and Ph.D. in mathematics, as well as an MBA from Tel Aviv University.
Rann was an assistant professor at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, from 19951997, and joined the Technion in September 1997.
Rann Smorodinsky's main research interests are in the field of game theory, and specifically learning issues in games (learning theory). The main solution concept used in game theory is the concept of Nash equilibrium. Learning theory attempts to provide dynamic foundations for the use of Nash equlibrium as a solution concept. Rann Smorodinsky's Ph.D. dealt with Bayesiantype learning, i.e., learning by rational agents. Nowadays his interests are in understanding how boundedly rational agents learn.
 Influence in multiagent decision problems:
 Repeated Large NonAnonymous Games (joint with N. AlNajjar)
 Implementing Cometitive Equlibrrium in A Bayesian Market Game (joint with N. AlNajjar)
 Game Theory, Equilibrium and Distributed Systems:
 An Incentive Based Protocol for Data Transmission (joint with D.Monderer and M.Tennenholtz)
 Equilibrium in An Asynchronous Model (joint with Y. Moses)
 MultiParty Computation and Equilibrium Considerations
 Smorodinsky, R. (1991), The asymptotic value of two house weighted majority games, M.Sc. thesis, Tel Aviv University.
 Smorodinsky, R. (1995), Dynamic learning in multiagent games, Ph.D. thesis, Tel Aviv University.
 Lehrer, E. and Smorodinsky, R., Compatible measures and merging, Mathematics of Operations Research 21 (3), 697706, 1996
 Lehrer, E. and Smorodinsky, R., Merging and learning, Statistics, Probability and Game TheoryPapers in Honor of David Blackwell (T. Ferguson, L. Shapley, eds.), IMS Lecture Notes  Monograph Series 30, 1996
 Lehrer, E. and Smorodinsky, R., Repeated large games with incomplete information, Games and Economic Behavior 18, 116134, 1997
 Jackson, Matt, Ehud Kalai and Rann Smorodinsky, "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited." Econometrica, Vol.67, 4, 875894. 1999
 Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky, "The Speed of Rational Learning", International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 199210, 1999
 Kalai, Ehud, Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky, Calibrated forecast and merging, Games and Economic Behavior (special issue in honor of David Blackwell), Vol. 29, 151169, 1999.
 Lehrer, Ehud and Rann Smorodinsky, "Relative Entropy in Sequential Decision Problems" , Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 33, 425439, 2000.
 AlNajjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "Provision of a Public Good with Bounded Project Costs", Economics Letters, 2000, vol. 67, pp. 297301.
 AlNajjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence", Journal of Economic Theory 2000, vol. 92, pp. 318342.
 Smorodinsky, Rann, "The Reflection Effect for Constant Risk Averse Agents", Mathematical Social Science 40, 265276, 2000.
 AlNajjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "Large NonAnonymous Repeated Games", Games and Economic Behavior 2001, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp 2639.
 Sandroni, Alvaro, Rann Smorodinsky and Rakesh Vohra, "Calibration with Many Checking Rules", Mathematics of Operations Research Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 141153, 2003.
 Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky, " Belief Based Equilibrium", Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 47, 1, pp. 151171. 2004.
 Neyman, Avraham and Rann Smorodinsky, " Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games", Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 29, 4, 739775, 2004.
 Smorodinsky, Rann, " Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random", Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 50, Issue 1, pp. 311, July 2005
 Smorodinsky, Rann and Moshe Tennenholtz, " Sequential Information Elicitation in MultiAgent Systems", accepted to the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2004), 2004
 Smorodinsky, Rann and Moshe Tennenholtz. " Overcoming Free Riding in MultiParty Computations  The Anonymous Case". Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 55, Issue 2, May 2006, pp. 385406. (Mini Special Issue: Electronic Market Design).
 Gneezy, Uri and Rann Smorodinsky. "All Pay Auctions  An Experimental Study", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 61/2, October, 2006.
 AlNajjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "The Efficiency of Competitive Mechanisms under Private Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 137, pp. 383403.
 AlNajjar, Nabil, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky and Jonathan Weinstein, "Testing Theories with Learnable and Predictive Representations", Journal of Economic Theory, 145, pp. 22032217, November 2010..
 Aricha, Inbar and Rann Smorodinsky. "Information Elicitation and
Sequential Mechanisms". IJGT, forthcoming 2012
 Kuniavski Sergey and Rann Smorodinsky, "Equilibrium and
Potential in Coalitional Congestion Games." Theory and Decision, forthcoming 2012
 Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz, "Signaling
Competition and Social Welfare." Transactions on Economics and Computation
(TEAC), forthcoming 2012.
 Nissim, Kobbi, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz,
"Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy", accepted
to The 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) conference.
 Orlandi, Claudio, Kobbi Nissim and Rann Smorodinsky, "Privacy Aware
Mechanism Design." Accepted to EC2012.
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