Rann Smorodinsky received his B.Sc., M.Sc. and Ph.D. in mathematics, as well as an MBA from Tel Aviv University.

Rann was an assistant professor at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, from 1995--1997, and joined the Technion in September 1997.

Rann Smorodinsky's main research interests are in the field of game theory, and specifically learning issues in games (learning theory). The main solution concept used in game theory is the concept of Nash equilibrium. Learning theory attempts to provide dynamic foundations for the use of Nash equlibrium as a solution concept. Rann Smorodinsky's Ph.D. dealt with Bayesian-type learning, i.e., learning by rational agents. Nowadays his interests are in understanding how boundedly rational agents learn.

• Influence in multi-agent decision problems:
  1. Repeated Large Non-Anonymous Games (joint with N. Al-Najjar)
  2. Implementing Cometitive Equlibrrium in A Bayesian Market Game (joint with N. Al-Najjar)
  
  
• Game Theory, Equilibrium and Distributed Systems:
  1. An Incentive Based Protocol for Data Transmission (joint with D.Monderer and M.Tennenholtz)
  2. Equilibrium in An Asynchronous Model (joint with Y. Moses)
  3. Multi-Party Computation and Equilibrium Considerations

• Smorodinsky, R. (1991), The asymptotic value of two house weighted majority games, M.Sc. thesis, Tel Aviv University.

   

• Smorodinsky, R. (1995), Dynamic learning in multi-agent games, Ph.D. thesis, Tel Aviv University.

   

• Lehrer, E. and Smorodinsky, R., Compatible measures and merging, Mathematics of Operations Research 21 (3), 697--706, 1996

   

• Lehrer, E. and Smorodinsky, R., Merging and learning, Statistics, Probability and Game Theory--Papers in Honor of David Blackwell (T. Ferguson, L. Shapley, eds.), IMS Lecture Notes - Monograph Series 30, 1996

   

• Lehrer, E. and Smorodinsky, R., Repeated large games with incomplete information, Games and Economic Behavior 18, 116--134, 1997

   

• Jackson, Matt, Ehud Kalai and Rann Smorodinsky, "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited." Econometrica, Vol.67, 4, 875-894. 1999

   

• Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky, "The Speed of Rational Learning", International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 199-210, 1999

   

• Kalai, Ehud, Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky, Calibrated forecast and merging, Games and Economic Behavior (special issue in honor of David Blackwell), Vol. 29, 151-169, 1999.

   

• Lehrer, Ehud and Rann Smorodinsky, "Relative Entropy in Sequential Decision Problems" , Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 33, 425-439, 2000.

   

• Al-Najjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "Provision of a Public Good with Bounded Project Costs", Economics Letters, 2000, vol. 67, pp. 297-301.

   

• Al-Najjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence", Journal of Economic Theory 2000, vol. 92, pp. 318-342.

   

• Smorodinsky, Rann, "The Reflection Effect for Constant Risk Averse Agents", Mathematical Social Science 40, 265-276, 2000.

   

• Al-Najjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "Large Non-Anonymous Repeated Games", Games and Economic Behavior 2001, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp 26-39.

   

• Sandroni, Alvaro, Rann Smorodinsky and Rakesh Vohra, "Calibration with Many Checking Rules", Mathematics of Operations Research Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 141-153, 2003.

   

• Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky, " Belief Based Equilibrium", Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 47, 1, pp. 151-171. 2004.

   

• Neyman, Avraham and Rann Smorodinsky, " Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games", Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 29, 4, 739-775, 2004.

   

• Smorodinsky, Rann, " Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random", Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 50, Issue 1, pp. 3-11, July 2005

   

• Smorodinsky, Rann and Moshe Tennenholtz, " Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems", accepted to the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-2004), 2004

   

• Smorodinsky, Rann and Moshe Tennenholtz. " Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations - The Anonymous Case". Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 55, Issue 2, May 2006, pp. 385-406. (Mini Special Issue: Electronic Market Design).

   

• Gneezy, Uri and Rann Smorodinsky. "All Pay Auctions - An Experimental Study", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 61/2, October, 2006.

   

• Al-Najjar, Nabil and Rann Smorodinsky, "The Efficiency of Competitive Mechanisms  under Private Information",  Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 137, pp. 383-403.

   

• Al-Najjar, Nabil, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky and Jonathan Weinstein, Testing Theories with Learnable and Predictive Representations.

 

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